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INFANT POLITICAL AGENCY  
REDRAWING THE EPISTEMIC BOUNDARIES OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION 
ANDRE SANTOS CAMPOS 
From its inception, one of liberalism’s main concerns with regard to legitimacy and 
power was to upgrade individuals from subjects of a king to citizens of a state. The 
change in status had important implications for children. As subjects, there is little 
distinction between children and adults, for both are equally under the king’s authority. 
Citizens of a state, however, are those who consent to authority as the basis of political 
power, which makes it paramount to distinguish between those who have the rational 
capacity to consent and those who do not. Children are often viewed as lacking such 




Epistemic impairment has been the decisive yardstick when excluding infants 
from political agency. In general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 
‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. Whereas personal 
agency entails the capacities to form, realise, and revise temporally-extended plans, 
political agency involves the capacity to act in concert with others by exercising 
political power. From this viewpoint, infants are utterly incapable of being ‘normative 
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 By ‘infants’ I mean those children, mostly babies and toddlers, who are not-yet-in-language (Duhn 
2015), the typical standard for assessing epistemic competence. The reason I focus on infants is that they 
are excluded from (theoretical and practical) political forms especially devised to include children who 
are capable of participating in some stage of decision-making (Lister 2007; Lieber 2008; Jans 2004; 




agents’ (Griffin 2008, 45) insofar as they lack the autonomy and the freedom to 
deliberate and to carry out any deliberations. Consequently, they cannot be regarded as 
political agents. 
The epistemic impairment of infants is also invoked, most forcefully by will-
theorists of rights, as a reason for claiming that infants do not have rights. Unlike 
interest-theorists, which view the function of rights as one of protecting significant 
interests, will-theorists propose to see rights as zones of freedom to be granted only to 
those able to exercise the powers to waive or to seek enforcement of the relevant claims. 
As a result, infants do not have rights strictly speaking, even though they still have 
interests that can be protected through granting rights directly to those able to exercise 
powers associated with the relevant claims, namely parents or guardians (Kramer 2001, 
30). Some authors counter such conclusions simply by endorsing an interest theory of 
rights (MacCormick 1976, 315; Sumner 1987, 47) or by restricting children’s rights to 
their developing competencies (Cowden 2012); others recognise the soundness of both 
views and apply them conjointly to children, who change through their different stages 
of development from being the sort of creatures whose interests are protected by rights 
to being the sort of creatures whose rights protect their choices (Brennan 2003). 
However, even these authors who grant rights to infants on account of their 
having interests deserving of special protection tend to narrow the scope of such rights 
to welfare rights, not extending them to political rights. What is deserving of protection 
is that infants are particularly vulnerable as human persons and that they have the 
potential to become citizens when they grow up, not the fact that they are citizens 
already. Political agency is a mere future possibility that is entirely disconnected from 
their condition as infants. One way to bypass the epistemic requirement of political 




surrogates who share or advocate interests which may be coincidental with their 
interests, such as parents, guardians and trustees. These forms of political agency would 
mirror proposals for empowering other kinds of vulnerable and epistemically-impaired 
subjects, such as shown in the literature on mental disability and on so-called animal 
citizenship. This solution, however, introduces new problems to democratic theory, for 
instance by privileging the political agency of parents, guardians and trustees over other 
citizens. 
This article offers an alternative to this conceptual frame of reference by making 
a case for the political agency of infants. Firstly, it maintains that political agency can 
be understood in terms of the several facets involved in political representation. 
Secondly, it claims that the all-affected principle can be reformulated as an ‘infant-
affected-interests’ principle which determines their membership of the class of the 
represented. Thirdly, it explores the ways through which this political agency can occur 
without having to resort to alternative conceptions of representation. The conclusion 
ascertains that infant enfranchisement is highly undesirable and that there are more 
viable forms to promote infant political agency, such as virtual representation, infant-
beneficial principles of political action and ombudspersons for infants. 
 
1. Political agency via representation 
Conceptions of political agency typically differ with regard to three aspects: the nature 
of the action; the context of the action; and the nature of the agent. The traditional 
liberal view of political agency requires some sort of participation by autonomous 
individuals in any given stage of the decision-making processes of a body politic. 




public issues, which is why political agency depends upon qualities that can be 
distributed unequally. Assuming public office, membership of the franchise, and 
communicating with representatives are the most visible institutional manifestations of 
what it means to act in the public realm. Those who do not have the capabilities to 
participate in these collective decision-making processes are not necessarily excluded 
on the grounds of discrimination – they simply lack the minimum requirements for 
inclusion. The political action is then (i) a visible and direct expression of the will, (ii) 
within an institutional decision-making process, (iii) performed by individuals who are 
capable of making their own decisions and of meeting their own needs. 
 The expansion of theoretical approaches to political inclusion, especially in the 
wake of phenomena associated with civil rights movements, prompted the appearance 
of alternative conceptions of political agency. Criticism of the liberal view focuses on 
any of its three aspects. Some authors seem to endorse the thesis that there is no need to 
have a direct and deliberate action in order to have political agency – habitual and 
unconscious obedience to the rules established in an institutional context is a sufficient 
condition of political agency, even if measured by degrees (Nagel 2005, 128-30; Pogge 
2005, 78-80; Jubb 2014; Abdel-Nour 2016; Zakaras 2018). Other authors broaden the 
scope of political agency by refusing to restrict it to actual participation in institutional 
political processes; rather, they equate it with a variety of individual and collective, 
official and mundane, rational and affective ways of acting and impacting in different 
social movements (Barnett 2008; Saward 2010). And other authors simply maintain that 
the grounds of political agency is a notion of subjectivity that is socially conditioned 
and open-ended (Colapietro 2006), that is, in which agents do not have to be 
ontologically independent individuals but rather relational entities inside a network of 




The purpose underlying these lines of criticism consists in establishing a more 
comprehensive politics of inclusion, either at the level of shared responsibilities for 
government actions or at the level of collective decision making. However, there is no 
need to reject the three aspects of the liberal conception in order to acknowledge that 
political agency can be ascribed to any member of the polity.  
 Personal autonomy tends to be a crucial element of the idea that a democratic 
process is ‘a requirement for making binding decisions’ (Dahl 1989, 105) and that only 
people capable of acting autonomously have a right to democratic rule. Within this 
context, the typical debate on political agency concentrates on actions deriving from 
membership of a franchise. But attempts at promoting political agency are chiefly 
attempts at finding the right equilibrium between political subjection and political 
citizenship. Some authors suggest the need to reshape contemporary electoral systems 
in order to promote equality of opportunity through representation (Barber 2001; 
Rehfeld 2005; Amy 2008); others emphasise the role that political parties have in 
guaranteeing the conditions of political agency (Rosenblum 2008; White & Ypi 2016); 
others prefer to draw attention to how equal political agency requires proportional 
participation in which no minority is left behind in multicultural societies (Kymlicka 
1995; Phillips 1995; Williams 1998); others claim that representation is capable of 
being all-inclusive if the object of representation is not people as such but rather 
discourses expressing presumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions or capacities 
(Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008); and others understand agency simply in terms of advocacy 




 These strategies interpret agency within the traditional framework of political 
representation encompassing formal elective authorisation and accountability.
2
 The 
emphasis on the franchise can be explained by the fact that the actions of representatives 
are justified often as responsive only to active political participation. When this occurs, 
norms and policies are issued toward a group of persons which outnumbers 
considerably the group of persons to which public officials believe to be responsive and 
accountable. Consequently, the elected representatives are first and foremost the 
representatives of the members of the franchise rather than of the people by and large. 
But in terms of political representation, there is a conceptual and normative distinction 
between the represented and the franchise. Those who participate in the franchise 
automatically acquire the status of being represented in the operation of representative 
government, but that does not mean that representative government only represents 
members of the franchise.  
An effective politics of inclusion is necessarily attentive to the asymmetry 
between the represented and the franchise. Representative democracy is increasingly 
inclusive to the extent that the number of people granted a right to participate in the 
making of collective decisions approximates as much as possible the number of people 
ruled by those decisions. From the viewpoint of democratic theory, this is the main 
                                                          
2
 Alternative versions of representation often dismiss electoral forms of representative government. This 
allows them to classify representative democracy as 'post-democracy' (Crouch 2004), ‘counter-
democracy’ (Rosanvallon 2008), ‘monitory democracy (Keane 2009), ‘politics of resonance’ (Tormey 
2015), or ‘politics of authenticity’ (Saward 2010). Authors such as Saward (2009) and Montanaro (2017), 
for instance, develop compelling accounts of the advantages of having non-elected self-appointed 
representatives, even if they still rely on a notion of representation encompassing mechanisms of 
authorisation and accountability. The reason I focus on more traditional frameworks of representation is 
that intervention outside a persistent system of representative government is mainly a form of counter-
power. And, as counter-power, participants in such movements are reduced to the position of trying to 
influence decision-making processes rather than participating in them. Non-electoral representation 




justification for promoting universal suffrage. The progressive tendency toward 
diminishing this asymmetry assumes that being affected by government action is 
sufficient reason for having a right to participate in that government. Such an all-
affected principle typically determines membership of the franchise, that is, the right to 
participate in government action is understood often as a right to vote. But there is no 
strong reason why it cannot also be understood simply as a right to being represented. In 
this latter sense, a basic condition for being included in representative processes would 
be that a person is ‘legally affected’ by the decisions enacted by the representatives 
(Dryzek 2002; Katz 1997, 217; Young 2000, 6; Beckman 2009). One acts indirectly, via 
a third party – a representative. Such a right would imply a duty on the part of the 
representatives to take the affected interests into consideration in the representative 
action, regardless of the problem of membership of the franchise. Their decisions and 
actions as representatives are therefore justified as responsive to those who are to be 
legally affected by those same decisions and actions. 
Responsiveness is not to be understood chronologically. Rather, it is part of a 
reciprocal constitutive relation between the representatives and the represented. 
Representation is more than the mere coincidence of claims to representation and actual 
pre-existent interests in light of some normative criterion; it is also constitutive. A 
representative action occurs whenever genuine claims to representation are constitutive 
of the role of the representatives and of the actual represented. Representation does not 
simply amplify a voice which was not being heard, one that already manifests a 
minimum epistemic faculty. Rather, it creates it anew in the political arena. It gives a 
voice to those who were otherwise silent and who acquire a political existence only 
because they now have a voice. The representative action is constitutive of their voice 




them. The representative action is the action of the represented, not of the 
representatives. 
The literature on representation referenced hitherto tends to focus on the activity 
of representatives or on their authorisation for acting. But on the strength of the 
constitutive nature of political representation, it is important that the focus is on the 
represented. The problem of identifying agency is somehow connected to the problems 
of membership of the class of the represented. The right to being represented politically 
implies a duty on the part of the representatives to take the legally-affected interests into 
consideration in the representative action, regardless of the problems concerning the 
franchise or the proper operation of government. In this sense, representation can be 
constitutive of actions that are not necessarily direct expressions of an individual will, 
even if they are performed in an institutional decision-making process. The following 
sections show how this applies to infants. 
 
2. The all-affected principle 
If what was maintained in the previous section holds, political agency can be 
ascertained by establishing the criterion of membership of the class of the represented. 
This is a minimalist conception of political agency. It does not overrule the importance 
of epistemic conditions in order to act politically – but it acknowledges that those 
epistemic conditions can be met via a third party. 
 This argument is a variant of ‘the boundary problem’, which tries to establish 
who should have a right to take part in which decisions in democratic decision making. 
The classical literature on the boundary problem, though, equates the criteria for 




franchise. It does not come as a surprise, then, that the authors who first pioneered 
discussions of this problem, such as Dahl (1970), Cohen (1971) and Whelan (1983), 
emphasise the importance of direct individual epistemic conditions for exercising 
political rights. However, the criteria for determining political agency do not have to be 
as demanding as the conditions for becoming enfranchised. The scope of membership 
only needs to be determined with regard to the class of the represented, and not 
necessarily to the franchise. 
Debates about the problem of scope tend to boil down to the ‘all-affected 
principle’, an intuitively attractive criterion according to which those who are relevantly 
affected by a decision ought to have, in some sense and to varying degrees depending 
on how much they are affected by it, influence over the decision (Dahl 1970, 64; Cohen 
1971, 8; Whelan 1983, 16; Shapiro 1996, 232; Goodin 2007, 50; Brighouse and 
Fleurbaey 2010, 2). But the problems introduced by the principle are myriad. The 
particular conception of ‘affected’ that one embraces ultimately leads to different 
conclusions with regard to who can count as ‘affected’. For instance, what kind of 
interests are relevant; whether ‘affected’ implies a necessary causal relation or only 
probabilistic reasoning; whether all stakeholders are equally relevant; etc. In addition, 
even if the meaning of ‘affected’ were undisputable, one would still need to ascertain 
exactly what is implied in the practice of ‘influencing’ a collective decision. Is it a right 
to vote? To participate in deliberative experiences of decision making? To intervene in 
some stage of the exercise of government? Would ‘influencing’ always imply some sort 
of minimum epistemic condition?  
In light of these difficulties, the representative process is likely to suffer from 
overinclusion and indeterminacy. In order to bypass such risks, some authors prefer the 




the laws should have the right to take part in the making of the laws (Miller 2009; 
Beckman 2009, 36-50; Tännsjö 1992; Owen 2012; López-Guerra 2005). Such a 
principle understands the membership of the demos in terms of a ‘government by the 
governed’. But its scope is also quite unclear. A tourist with a provisional visa for 
visiting country X is arguably legally bound by the laws of country X during the time of 
her stay. Does that mean that she should have a right to participate in some stage of law-
making processes in country X during that time (Arrhenius 2018)? Also, many 
stakeholders, such as companies and businesses, are legally bound by laws even though 
their nature excludes them from representative political processes. Should they be 
granted political rights simply because they are liable to incur in some sort of legal 
responsibility? 
The all-affected principle, even in its narrower form, cannot be formulated in an 
all-or-nothing fashion in such a way as to provide a definitive solution to the risks of 
overinclusion and practical indeterminacy. But those dangers can be mitigated if the 
principle is interpreted as including sets of different kinds of requisites. For instance, 
with regard to the risk of overinclusion, the all-affected principle can encompass a 
combination of different criteria, such as being affected in certain legal and non-legal 
ways, being human, being alive, etc. And with regard to the risk of practical 
indeterminacy, the principle may determine that ‘influence’ is to be understood not 
simply in the sense of a direct action of individual participation, but also in the sense of 
indirect (e.g. delegated) and passive (e.g. structural or cultural) kinds of influence (Fung 
2013, 254-9). 
In order to be acceptable and valid, it is important that the criteria included in 
this version of the all-affected principle do not conflict. In addition, they should be 




instance, the legally-subjected criterion is interpreted often as involving a certain 
epistemic threshold (Miller 2009; Owen 2012) – the same threshold that is characteristic 
of ‘influence’ as active direct participation. One can only be actually bound by public 
norms and policies if one is capable of grasping their meaning. According to this view, 
the more one narrows down the all-affected principle by adding criteria of political 
inclusion, the more those who fail to meet the minimum epistemic conditions of 
normative agency, such as infants, are likely to be excluded. And if they are excluded 
because they cannot be legal subjects, it does not matter whether they can influence 
political action ‘indirectly’. 
However, the role of epistemic conditions in this version of the all-affected 
principle does not have to be particularly demanding. In light of the all-subjected 
criterion, what actually needs to be affected is not persons as such or their genuine wills, 
but rather the interests that the public norms and policies are aimed to protect. From a 
legal point of view, it is irrelevant whether people who are addressees of public norms 
and policies conform to pre-established normative contents because they are bound by 
them and understand the corresponding ought statements. What matters is an objective 
correspondence between the actual actions or states of affairs and the contents of public 
norms and policies. Obviously, anyone who is bound by a law is ipso facto affected by 
it. But it is not the fact that the person is bound by the law that makes her affected by 
the law; rather, it is the fact that a law’s binding someone to act in a certain way actually 
contributes to achieving what the law is aimed to achieve. A law prohibiting people to 
commit murder does not affect its addressees simply by establishing them as its 
addressees), but rather by binding them in such a way that is conducive to other people 
not being murdered. Insofar as public norms and policies protect relevant interests 




all-affected-interests principle. What matters in order to determine the ‘legally affected’ 
is not so much whether someone is capable of reasoning her way through an ought-
relation, but whether the interests envisioned by a legal norm are indeed protected as a 
result of someone being able to reason her way through an ought-relation. 
The same kind of reasoning applies to the notion of ‘influence’. If someone is 
affected by a specific political decision because her relevant interests are at stake, the 
influence that must be exerted on the decision is justified in light of the interest that is 
being affected. It seems perfectly possible for the actual interest rather than the actual 
interest-holder to justify such influence. This means that influence can be reinterpreted 
in the sense of admitting non-direct expressions of will by actual interest-holders. 
Representation is precisely the kind of agency that introduces new interests into the 
political arena. Being a member of the class of the represented entails having one’s 
interests included in the representative process, even if one is not a member of the 
franchise for failing to meet epistemic requirements. 
 
3. The infant-affected-interests principle 
In order for the all-affected-interests principle to apply to infants, three assumptions 
must obtain: that infants have interests justifying political action; that these interests can 
be affected legally and non-legally by political action; and that such interests justify the 
exertion of ‘influence’ in political decision making. 
With regard to the first assumption, it is important not to confuse ‘having 
interests’ with ‘having needs’ or ‘wanting something’. The dismissal of epistemic 
requirements for the class of the represented calls for an objective conception of 




regarded here as having objective reasons for wanting something. Having an interest in 
some x, for instance, is having a reason, all-things-considered, to want that x. 
Statements about persons having interests in x can have truth-value depending not on 
whether those persons actually want or need x, but on whether such statements express 
justifications that those persons would have endorsed in ideal epistemic circumstances.  
Interests coincide with that which is most valuable concerning a person. The 
values of life, well-being, self-development and self-determination fit exactly into this 
description. The relevant affected interests are those that significantly impact chances 
and opportunities related to such values. The principle as a normative claim turns on 
affectedness negatively by prohibiting what undermines such interests, and positively 
by imposing the conditions for fulfilling them. Some interests can therefore be imputed 
to a person that lacks the minimum epistemic conditions for understanding or 
formulating them, so long as they can be rationally justified. Basic interests such as 
physical integrity and minimum provision of resources, for instance, are shared by all 
human persons, regardless of age. 
 With regard to the second assumption, it seems obvious that government 
decisions can have a significant impact on infants, for instance when pursuing policies 
that either promote adequate conditions of welfare or that undermine the quality of life. 
But, more importantly, there are at least two ways in which infants’ interests are legally 
affected by political action. The first is that infants are addressees of norms and policies 
in the indirect sense of being subject to institutions that are authorised to exercise 
coercion over them or over other persons because of them, even if infants are not 
necessarily bound by legal duties. This argument centres on the scope of political action 
from the viewpoint of legal institutions, which is typically defined in terms of 




normative rather than territorial. The addressees of such norms and policies directed at 
institutions whose aims include protecting infants are the officials of those institutions. 
They are the ones either bound by legal injunctions or authorised by power-conferring 
norms to exercise discretion in creating further infant-protecting norms. But the efficacy 
of infant-protecting norms, whether duty-conferring or power-conferring, depends upon 
infants actually being protected by the implementation of the contents of such norms 
and policies. They thus become legal subjects indirectly.  
The second way is far more decisive. Infants’ interests are legally affected 
because infants are legal persons. And as legal persons, there is no fundamental flaw in 
granting them citizenship rights. This assertion lacks further clarification. If one accepts 
that infants have rights on account of having protected interests, as interest-theorists of 
rights will probably do, then everything that produces an impact on the contents of such 
rights (mostly, welfare rights) falls under the purview of the all-affected-interests 
principle. But with regard to civil and political rights, even interest-theorists will agree 
that epistemic conditions cannot simply be jettisoned – the existence of objective 
interests does not produce by itself a civil and political right-holder. The action of 
influencing (and/or participating in) collective decision-making processes is justified by 
the fact that those processes affect relevant interests. The reason why assessing affected 
interests is important is that it provides access to the means of influencing (and/or 
participating in) political action. If one is incapable of expressing one’s will, there is no 
need to assess affected interests and one could hardly talk of civil infant rights. This is a 
strong argument in favour of will-theorists of rights. 
It is possible to sidestep this difficulty, though, by reconciling interest- and will-
theories. For certain persons in certain situations of epistemic insufficiencies, one could 




holding (Brennan 2003). However, the elements of this reconciliation seem overly 
vague. How is one to assess when to privilege one over the other? And how is one to 
determine the affected interests when those interests are only relevant whenever there is 
a capable will, such as seems to occur with regard to civil and political rights? In its 
general form, the reconciliation does not allow us to identify what is common to 
interests and wills in relation to rights.  
Such vagueness can be overcome by the notion of juridical personality. All 
children have personal value and certain interests, and many have a minimum capacity 
for practical deliberation in terms of expressing will. Their normative status is not 
circumscribed by a legal threshold beyond which they have rights and before which 
they have no rights. Rather, their right-holding is a multi-model capacity according to 
which the capacity for rights is different from the capacity for acts. To say that a person 
has a capacity for rights is merely to say that she is a person and that others have to treat 
her as a person; the capacity for acts is the power or ability of a person to cause 
normative consequences directly through her acts and conduct. One person can then 
have a capacity for right R at moment t1 and only acquire the capacity to act associated 
with R at a future moment t2; between t1 and t2 R will have to be exercised via someone 
else.  
In private relations, parents and guardians can fulfil that role. They are, in the 
majority of cases, the best judges of the interests of their infants.  But at the level of the 
operation of representative government, this presents certain problems. On the one 
hand, parents would be more politically empowered than non-parent adults. On the 
other hand, there is no guarantee that parents would not simply interpret their children’s 
interests as mere extensions of their own interests, which would lead to subordinating 




fulfil in the public sphere the role that parents have vis-à-vis children in private 
relations. Infants can then be recognised as civil and political right-holders even if they 
exercise their rights via elected officials. Any kind of decision that impacts negatively 
on the recognition of such citizenship rights or on the promotion of their (indirect 
present or) future exercise can be said to affect infants legally and politically. 
As for the third assumption, about whether infants’ interests justify influencing 
political processes, it all seems to boil down to whether or not they can be included in 
the class of the represented. If infants are indeed subjects of representative government 
and their interests are affected in every relevant sense of the word, there is no reason 
why their subjection, personal value, legal personality and citizenship status should not 
be reflected in the representative process. They are members of the class of the 
represented even if they are not recognised with membership of the franchise. 
The representative action that concerns infants is not mandate-free. Since infants 
are unable to express their will or even of having a (competent and reasonable) will, the 
interests that they are recognised as holding must be made present in the political action 
via the epistemic conditions that they fail to meet. In light of the objective notion of 
interests in play, the interests that are voiced in the representative action are those that 
the interest-holders would have endorsed if they did not fail to meet basic epistemic 
conditions. Overcoming the epistemic insufficiency is the content of the representatives’ 
mandate. 
In this latter sense, representation can be constitutive of actions that are (i) 
indirect expressions of what the represented would have willed in optimal epistemic 
conditions; (ii) the outcome of institutional decision-making processes; and (iii) 




meeting their own needs. It is an indirect case of political agency – but it is political 
agency nevertheless, one that ultimately ‘influences’ political decisions. 
 
4. Developing infant political agency 
Once it is established that representation conveys the agency of persons with 
provisional epistemic impairments, infants can be considered political agents. But the 
means of such agency remain unclear. They cannot equate with the traditional means of 
democratic representation whereby representatives are elected by epistemically 
functional constituents. Regardless of what is particularly distinctive of infants, 
especially when compared to other citizens (for instance, excessive vulnerability, 
epistemic impairment, potential development, a special relation to the future, etc.), the 
very nature of the representative action differs from the general terms that guide the 
action of elected officials. The following pages explore the ways through which infant 
political agency can occur without having to resort to alternative conceptions of 
representation such as surrogacy, guardianship, advocacy or authenticity. 
 
4.1. Beyond infant enfranchisement 
Debates about political agency regardless of age have centred chiefly on the nature and 
quality of the franchise. If the main criteria of membership of a franchise are affected 
interests and epistemic competence, there is no definitive reason to exclude competent 
children from voting (Archard, 1993, 74; Schrag, 2004). The ways of conceiving of 
epistemic competence in this context are myriad. For instance, some authors argue that 




justice, we ought only to enfranchise those whom we can reasonably expect to vote 
according to such a conception (Clayton 2006). Other authors appeal to a less-
demanding threshold according to which one must be capable of ‘elaborating, reflecting 
on, and revising ideas about justice’ (Christiano 2008, 128). And others focus on 
political knowledge and on the ability to deliberate in reasonable terms in light of such 
information (Brennan 2016). Regardless of how one understands epistemic competence, 
many adolescents and older children seem to be very close to young adults, which 
provides a strong reason for child enfranchisement in these terms. At the same time, 
making enfranchisement dependent upon epistemic conditions leads to the exclusion of 
infants. 
Such unique attention to the epistemic criterion leads supporters of child 
enfranchisement to reject a minimum voting age altogether (Cook 2013) or to endorse 
thresholds encompassing children of around 12 (Wald 1974; Umbers 2018) or 16 (Hart 
& Atkins 2011; Grover 2011, 237-50; Peto 2018). Their focus is always on how 
children can fulfil the criteria of competence in order to become members of the 
franchise, rather than on characteristics that children may have qua children that 
automatically justify their exclusion from the franchise. Ultimately, the exercise of 
voting rights cannot dismiss basic epistemic conditions. Infants, regardless of where the 
minimum threshold is set, will never be able to exercise such rights. 
The strategies for overcoming this exclusion are twofold. The first is to attribute 
voting rights to children of all ages, albeit exercised by their parents or guardians 
(Ringen 1997; Parijs 1998; Wall 2014). But this is highly problematic, for several 
reasons. Firstly, infants and parents would have an equal right to vote, but parents 
would not have a right to vote for their children – only a duty. Parents would have to 




behalf and in their interest. Such a state of affairs produces a double-stage of 
representation. Infants would have to be represented by their parents in order to be 
represented by elected officials. Such a needless duplication of representation would 
most likely weaken rather than strengthen the inclusion of infants in representative 
government. The rights that infants could claim would apply mostly in the first stage of 
representation, vis-à-vis their parents, thereby offering political representatives a chance 
to dismiss consideration of infants’ interests in decision-making processes. Elected 
officials could then maintain that ‘An infant’s true representative is her parent, not me; I 
represent the infant when I represent her representative, that is, her parent – those are 
the interests that I must voice in the representative action’. 
Secondly, it is unlikely that parents, when placing a ballot, would consider their 
own interests as parents differently from their children’s interests as infants. The issue is 
not simply whether parents can be trusted to vote in their children’s best interests or 
whether they would take the opportunity to add further votes in favour of the party of 
their preference (Hinrichs 2002, 46). Rather, the issue is that parents, when exercising a 
right to vote, may often rank their preferences not in light of their own self-interest but 
mostly in light of what they regard as best to their families, especially their infants. And 
if the interests of infants are already mirrored in the votes cast by their parents, then 
enfranchising infants would result simply in the duplication of votes by parents. In 
addition, and thirdly, high fertility rates would translate in more rights exercised by a 
specific group of persons (e.g. parents of large families). This would most likely lead to 
an unequal distribution of political power depending on the size of the number of 
children in the immediate family, thus violating the ‘one man, one vote’ principle. 
A second strategy for overcoming the exclusion of infants is to interpret the 




who share certain characteristics with children or who advocate (Urbinati 2000) 
interests which may be coincidental with their interests, but who are not necessarily in 
close contact with children (as opposed to their parents or guardians). However, 
surrogate representation at the level of the franchise also presents several problems. On 
the one hand, voting is typically a personal inalienable right. In practical terms, this is 
troublesome to proxy-voting. Most infants have two parents, who may not necessarily 
agree on what the child’s best interests are. Is each parent required then to exercise only 
half of a right to vote? Or should one parent be given the privilege of exercising the 
infant’s right rather than the other? And, if so, based on what criterion? On the other 
hand, one can hardly call a proxy relation as political representation. The resemblance 
of characteristics or of interests upheld is closer to what Hannah Pitkin called 
‘descriptive representation’ (Pitkin 1967, 60-91), that is, representativeness rather than 
representation. The act of mirroring characteristics or interests falls short of being actual 
inclusion. Additionally, representatives are not supposed to be stakeholders themselves, 
nor are they expected necessarily to share personal characteristics or interests with those 
they represent. 
Overall, focusing on child enfranchisement with regard to political agency seems 
to lead to the further inclusion of older children just as much as to a justification of the 
definitive exclusion of infants. 
 
4.2. The virtual representation of infants 
The reason why the epistemic criterion is so important when determining membership 
of the franchise is that the classical notion of political representation involves, in the 




interests are potentially affected by the actions of representatives. This constitutes from 
the outset an obstacle to including infants. Many of them are able neither to hold 
political institutions accountable nor to authorise their decisions in time. 
The formalistic version of representation, though, is not the sole model for 
including interests in decision-making. Representation can be regarded also in terms of 
the coincidence between the interests voiced by representatives and the actual interests 
of the represented. In this instance, a sympathetic validation by the relevant proto-
constituency at some reasonable future time (Rehfeld 2006) or authenticity (Saward 
2009) or surrogate accountability (Rubenstein 2007) seem like better criteria for 
determining representation than actual authorisation. 
Still, it is not clear that such alternative accounts can obtain equivalence between 
the present interests of infants and the actions of their specific representatives, at least 
not enough to substitute authorisation as a legitimate yardstick of representation. The 
fact that ‘surrogate’ often means a person or group whose only qualification it is that 
she or it actively seeks to represent the views of the underrepresented brings about 
certain problems. Self-proclaimed representatives are neither automatically the kinds of 
representatives the represented would choose for themselves nor necessarily do things 
that are in the interests of the represented. In general, the represented must actively 
endorse a specific action the representative stands for. The mere aspiration of the 
representative to achieve this does not suffice. When a legislator of a certain district 
claims to represent persons from a different district (Mansbridge 2003, 522-5), 
legitimacy follows from the latter actually endorsing or identifying with her politics. 
However, infants do not have the possibility of controlling what their representative is 
doing, whether the representative was elected (even though not by those they are 




proposals of alternative accounts of representation claim that it is important that the 
representative ‘receives validation by the relevant proto-constituency at some 
reasonable future date’ (Saward 2009, 18). But this is also problematic with regard to 
infants insofar as the future date in question can be well beyond what one could regard 
as ‘reasonable’. 
The way to circumvent these difficulties is to consider the representatives’ 
mandate as encompassing the interests of all the members of the class of the represented 
rather than the interests of one specific group of persons (inside or) outside the 
franchise. Authorisation is automatically attained the moment that representatives are 
elected by members of the franchise who are inherently members of the class of the 
represented. Their legitimacy as representatives is stronger the more the electorate 
coincides with the represented. 
But something further is required, namely the inclusion of the interests of those 
who are members of the class of the represented that are denied access to the franchise 
on the basis of epistemic impairment. This can be attained by applying Edmund Burke’s 
notion of virtual representation, whereby the representative activity connects those who 
claim to act for certain people who did not elect them to the very people in whose name 
they act. Burke’s argument is not that a member of parliament represents the whole 
nation but rather that groups or communities whose members do not belong to an 
electorate are still represented in parliament via the representation of those who are 
members of the electorate (Burke 1887, 89). All that is required is a substantive 
correspondence between the public action and the interests which the public action aims 
to serve. Burke’s virtual representation is different from surrogate representation in the 
sense that, rather than simply having officials claiming to represent infants, the interests 




with (and are determined by) interests held by members of the franchise, such as young 
adults, parents, and older children. 
Direct authorisation and accountability with regard to infants remain 
unattainable. But the representation of infants’ interests is still possible. The absence of 
direct substantive legitimacy can be replaced by having representatives seek several 
forms of eventual validation, including the after-the-fact coincidence between norms 
and policies enacted and the interests of infants. What is distinctive about virtual 
representation in this context is that it provides a mechanism for giving a political voice 
to infants’ interests not by bypassing authorisation and accountability, but rather by 
complying with the authorisation and accountability inherent in similar interests that are 
to be represented. This includes having elected officials giving voice to infant’s specific 
interests even when they conflict with some adults’ interests (especially because that 
there are always adults who have interests in having their children’s interests protected), 
as well as to infants’ special interests in long-term policies. There is no need to 
disenfranchise the elderly (Parijs 1998) in order to balance different interests in 
democratic representation. In fact, it is the opposite that must be done – enlarging the 
franchise and including in the representative action the interests of the members of the 
class of the represented rather than of the class of the electorate. 
Representation of interests held by infants does not necessarily require a high 
degree of creativity. All that is needed is the proper operation of democratic 
representation that takes into account the affected interests of all the members of the 
class of the represented. Still, Burke’s notion of virtual representation does not seem to 
actually include in representative action the interests of infants qua members of the 
class of the represented except insofar as they coincide with interests held by other 




in political decision-making processes, but other interests that may be specific to infants 
qua infants seem to be left out. In addition, insofar as representatives continue to regard 
the exercise of government as responsive chiefly to those members of the class of the 
represented who actually perform public actions of authorisation, they have a permanent 
incentive to overlook the most distinctive interests of infants. Something further must be 
added. 
 
4.3. Infant-beneficial principles and infants’ ombudspersons 
At the level of institutional design, especially within the framework of virtual 
representation, there are two ways of promoting the representation of infants. A first 
way of doing so consists in reforming political institutions in order to force them to 
regard infants as persons with interests to which those institutions must be responsive. 
This entails reinterpreting constitutional arrangements in the sense of binding 
representative institutions to infant-beneficial principles and policies. 
A good example of such efforts can be found in the notion of ‘child-friendly 
justice’, which refers to actual judicial systems and court proceedings (as well as to all 
officials dealing with children in relation to judicial proceedings, such as police, social 
and mental health services, etc.), by aiming to make them age appropriate, adapted to 
and focused on the particular needs and rights of children (Mahmoudi et al. 2015; 
Council of Europe 2015). The underlying rationale is to ensure that children’s best 
interests are privileged whenever a child is involved in any judicial proceeding. This 
involves protecting children on account of their vulnerability qua children, regardless of 
additional duties and responsibilities that are incumbent on parents and guardians. In 




child who aims to file suit against any entity that harms her best interests, including the 
state itself and child’s parents or guardians. 
Notwithstanding, child-friendly justice is generally restricted to the judicial 
branch. But there is no reason why it could not also be included in the legislative and 
executive branches of state authority. If states are to incorporate child-beneficial 
principles into their legal systems’ rules of adjudication, they must often do so by 
enacting legislation that favours child-friendly conditions to be upheld during judicial 
proceedings. The reason for doing so is not outside the representative relation itself. 
Rather, it is the fact that those best interests are included in the class of the represented 
that justifies first and foremost a reorganization of state institutions and functions in 
order to make them child-friendly.  
The problem with applying child-beneficial principles to representative action is 
that representatives are left with too much discretion when determining a child’s best 
interests, as opposed to her objective interests. A child’s ‘best interests’ is a vague 
expression which is to be specified by the representative institutions themselves. This 
leaves them unchecked politically and legally because they determine the contents of 
the principles of which they are the only addressees. It also provides them with an 
additional incentive to continue to guide their actions toward being responsive solely 
(and/or primarily) to the interests of those to which they are directly accountable and 
who directly authorised them.  
Such excess of discretion prompts the second institutional way of promoting the 
representation of infants, which is mostly a way of reinforcing a system of checks and 
balances with regard to the child-beneficial principles that are to guide representative 




members of the class of the represented. They are special cases of vulnerable persons 
because their vulnerability is assumed to be provisional. In other words, not only are 
they particularly vulnerable, but they also have a special relation to the future. Their 
epistemic impairment, which is somehow connected to their vulnerability, will recede 
inevitably as time passes – no further action or event, internally or externally caused, is 
needed. Some authors interpret this relation in terms of children having rights to an 
open future (Feinberg 1980), despite the facts that an ‘open future’ can hardly be 
translated into rights language and that many adults may also have a reasonable claim to 
an ‘open future’. The underlying justification for considering that infants’ interests are 
future-oriented is typically a ‘deficit conception of childhood’ (Matthews 2008), 
according to which a child is understood primarily as a configuration of missing 
capacities that normal adults have. Children are then ‘provisional non-adults’. However, 
the special relation of infants to the future has a different justification. It relies on the 
fact that for them, within a developmental framework in which abilities to act develop 
progressively, the gap between holding citizenship rights and being able to exercise 
them fully is as wide as can be. Their interests include necessarily the conditions for 
attaining the full exercise of the citizenship rights they already hold. And that entails a 
special relation to the long-term effects of political action. 
If these special interests are represented, they are likely to conflict with many 
short-term interests held by other members of the class of the represented. Unlike what 
programs such as ‘child-friendly justice’ seem to suggest, long-term interests cannot 
simply be privileged in political representation in detriment of conflicting short-term 
interests. Privileging the future in terms of producing policies that are responsive chiefly 
to the interests of persons with a special relation with a distant future cannot imply a 




clash with democracy in the sense that the interests of the actual members of the 
franchise would be brushed aside in the political process. In order to promote inclusion 
of all interests, representative action needs to strike a balance between relevant affected 
interests in the short-run and relevant special interests in the long-run. Privileging or 
prioritizing the interests of infants vis-à-vis other members of the represented would tilt 
the balance of relevant political interests in disfavour of those who actually participate 
in collective decision making. 
Still, infant political agency must somehow resonate in the public sphere in such 
a way as to make representatives responsive to infants’ distinctive interests. This could 
be attained by establishing an institution whose sole purpose is to influence political 
representatives to take the interests of infants into account – an institution that lies 
outside the representative state branches but that is capable of influencing them in their 
actions. Most forcefully, an ombudsperson for infants. 
The ombudsperson is an institution with far-reaching powers to investigate the 
actions of public entities, but whose decisions and resolutions are non-binding. 
Accordingly, it stands outside of the formal structure of the administrative and the 
judiciary systems. This gives the ombudsperson a certain level of independence. But it 
also entails that the public entities the ombudsperson surveys will not be compelled to 
act by its resolutions. Rather, the ombudsperson strives to ensure that public entities 
conform to norms and policies in force, such as constitutional dispositions, laws, 
regulations, and relevant international treaties. More importantly, however, it serves 
often as the representative of the citizens’ rights and interests vis-à-vis other public 
institutions. To carry out these functions, the ombudsperson may undertake several 
types of proactive action, such as ex officio investigations, information campaigns, 




can also take the initiative to recommend legislative action whenever required and to 
introduce new debates in the public sphere. Its tasks are as much legal as they are 
political. 
An ombudsperson for infants would be the ultimate step in infant political 
agency since it would reinforce the status of infants as represented by officials without 
necessarily sacrificing the adequate representation of non-infants. It is therefore 
important that the ombudsperson for infants can have the power to make legislative 
proposals without ever belonging to the legislative branch. It is not a decision-making 
body. The specific character of the ombudsperson means that it sets the tone of public 
debates by providing recommendations which do not imply necessarily a legal or 
administrative decision. They are nothing more but recommendations, which other 
entities can comply with or disregard as they see fit. 
In order to highlight infant political agency, it is important that such an 
ombudsperson is a state entity independent of the other state branches. Since its main 
purpose is to reinforce the political representation of infants, it should be connected 
more tightly to the legislative power than to the executive, for instance by having its 
titular named by parliament, and reporting back to this body. The creation of an 
ombudsperson for infants holds specific advantages in terms of legitimacy because it 
can be nominated by elected officials without the participation or consent of those 
whom the ombudsperson is set to represent. It is therefore accountable officially to 
those who nominate its titular – if appointed by a democratically elected parliament, 
formal accountability obtains. But as a political institution, the ombudsperson can and 
should also build popular support and recognition, which can subsequently be turned 
into political clout. In this sense, the ombudsperson must seek political accountability 




in favour of its claims to representation produces public reasons to dismiss its actions as 
sufficiently representative. But since such political accountability cannot be met in the 
specific case of infants qua infants due to their epistemic impairment, the ombudsperson 
is therefore accountable politically vis-à-vis the members of the class of the represented 
whose interests coincide with the objective interests of infants. The instrument of 
(informal) accountability is similar to the measure of accountability in virtual 
representation. 
The effectiveness of the ombudsperson depends on its ability to act in a versatile 
manner. Its functions must then encompass the possibility of undertaking different 
courses of action vis-à-vis other state agents while also upholding the interests of infants 
outside of the state, for instance by setting up communications networks and building 
alliances in order to enlist popular opinion in support of the interests that the 
ombudsperson is set to defend. Such non-formal tasks might contribute to having more 
members of the franchise endorse similar interests publicly, thereby reinforcing the 
virtual representation of infants at the level of government action.  
In the end, infant political agency is not guaranteed by the action of the 
ombudsperson, but rather by the admixture of different levels of representation 
developing in different state entities. The ombudsperson merely reinforces the virtual 
representation of infants and the implementation of infant-beneficial principles to 
representative actions. The integration of all these mechanisms in representative 
democracies reveals how infants are indeed members of the class of the represented. 
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